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ABSTRACT According to an argument commonly made by politicians, selling weapons to
oppressive and aggressive regimes can sometimes be permissible because the sale renders the
victims of these regimes no worse off than they would have been had the sale not been made.
We can refer to this argument as the inconsequence argument. My primary aim in this
article is to identify one reason why the inconsequence argument will often not succeed in vin-
dicating arms sales to oppressive and aggressive regimes. The inconsequence argument will
often not succeed because arms sales to oppressive and aggressive regimes often do make the
victims of these regimes worse off than they would have been had the sales not gone ahead.
The victims of these regimes are often made worse off in virtue of the fact that arms sales can
generate expressed harms, which, unlike some of the material harms often engendered by
such sales, are additive (rather than substitutive) in character. As I shall explain, expressed
harms are similar to, but also significantly different from, expressive harms. The differences
are important because they allow us to construct a reply that can answer the inconsequence
argument on its own (consequentialist) terms.
Marshall Cohen once remarked that ‘the history of international conduct is to an
alarming degree the history of unconscionable insolence, greed, and brutality’.1 One
practice in which such insolence, greed, and brutality manifests is the international
arms trade. Many states, and private firms within their jurisdiction, regularly supply
weapons to vicious regimes that brutally oppress their people and wage unjust wars
against their neighbours. They often do this for nakedly self-interested reasons and
with apparently minimal regard for the innocent individuals whose lives are blighted in
the process.
Sometimes, however, the politicians who licence these sales attempt to defend their
acts by appealing to moral considerations. According to one commonly made argu-
ment, which is the subject of this article, selling weapons to oppressive and aggressive
regimes can sometimes be permissible because the sale renders the victims of these
regimes no worse off than they would have been had the sale not been made. We can
refer to this argument, which I shall describe in greater detail in the next two sections,
as the inconsequence argument.
The inconsequence argument might be challenged in various ways. My primary aim
in this article is to identify one particular reason why the argument will often not suc-
ceed in vindicating arms sales to oppressive and aggressive regimes. The argument will
often not succeed because arms sales to oppressive and aggressive regimes often do
make the victims of these regimes worse off than they would have been had the sales
not gone ahead. The victims of these regimes might sometimes be made worse off for
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied
Philosophy, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA
02148, USA.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which
permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no
modifications or adaptations are made.
Journal of Applied Philosophy
doi: 10.1111/japp.12477
straightforward empirical reasons. For example, by participating in a particular arms
market, firms might drive down prices, thereby enabling oppressive and aggressive
regimes to acquire a larger quantity of weapons than they would otherwise have been
able to get their hands on.2 In this essay, I shall argue that victims are often made
worse off in a different way and that they can be made worse off in this way even if
the aforementioned empirical reasons do not apply. They are often made worse off in
virtue of the fact that arms sales can generate what I shall call expressed harms, which,
unlike some of the material harms often engendered by such sales, are additive (rather
than substitutive) in character. As I shall explain in Section 3, expressed harms are
similar to, but also significantly different from, expressive harms. The differences are
important because they allow us to construct a reply that can answer the inconse-
quence argument in its own (consequentialist) terms.
Throughout this article, I shall refer to oppressive and aggressive regimes as ‘outlaw
states’, and I will start by explaining how I intend this term to be understood. Doing
so will provide an opportunity to foreground the political salience of the essay’s topic.
The degree of oppression and aggression exhibited by states varies considerably, and
the term ‘outlaw state’ might plausibly be thought to identify only the very worst
offenders. To illustrate, in the next section I refer to arms sales to apartheid-era South
Africa and also to the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. Apartheid-era
South Africa was an obvious outlaw state, whereas Hong Kong (which is classed by
Freedom House as ‘partially free’ and in the Democracy Index as a ‘flawed democ-
racy’3) is a more contestable case (at least for now). But arms sales to Hong Kong are
nevertheless a cause for moral concern, a fact that has been brought sharply into focus
by recent developments.
In September 2014, the Hong Kong police deployed tear gas against peaceful
prodemocracy protesters, and it was subsequently revealed that the tear gas had been
supplied by a British firm, with the approval of the UK government. British politicians
blithely dismissed concerns about the police’s behaviour4, and arms sales to Hong
Kong continued. In July 2015, the British government issued an open-export licence
permitting a UK firm to sell to Hong Kong an unlimited quantity of crowd control
ammunition, CS hand grenades, smoke canisters, tear gas, irritant ammunition, and
riot control agents.5
The conduct of Hong Kong’s police force during the 2014 protests was consistent
with a more general upscaling of state repression,6 and in 2019, conditions deterio-
rated further. A government proposal to allow extraditions to the mainland, where
defendants could be tried in China’s notoriously political courts, precipitated the high-
est levels of unrest seen in the region for decades. Hundreds of thousands of demon-
strators took to the streets in a protracted series of protests across the city’s various
districts, and the authorities responded with hundreds of rubber bullets and thousands
of rounds of tear gas. In June, the British government announced that it would not
license any further sales of crowd control equipment, but existing licenses were not
revoked.7
While the final version of this article was being prepared, China’s authoritarian gov-
ernment sought to end continuing prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong by imposing
a controversial new antisedition law. Britain has introduced a new arms embargo in
response.
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What the case of Hong Kong suggests is that arms sales demand moral scrutiny not
only when they are made to the most egregious abusers of human rights, but also
when they are made to a wider range of states that can reasonably be expected to use
the weapons in question for the purpose of internal repression. When I use the term
‘outlaw state’, I shall use it in a broad sense that incorporates this wider range of
actors.
1. The Inconsequence Argument
According to a common argument, the provision of weapons to outlaw states can be
permissible under certain circumstances because it is sometimes inconsequential.
Sometimes, the argument goes, a transfer of arms to an outlaw state makes no relevant
difference to the lives of that state’s victims, for, had the transfer not gone ahead, it
would have been substituted by a similar transfer made by a different agent. If govern-
ment A had not provided weapons or authorized its firms to do so, government B
would have done so, and there was nothing government A could have done to change
that fact. This argument was used to defend arms transfers to apartheid-era South
Africa8, and it was made more recently by former British foreign secretary Philip
Hammond. When it was revealed that Hong Kong’s riot police had used British-made
tear gas against prodemocracy protesters, Hammond remarked: ‘CS gas is available
from large numbers of sources around the world. To be frank, I think that [i.e., the
fact that the riot police used British-made weapons] is a rather immaterial point. They
could buy CS gas from the US’.9 We can call this the inconsequence argument.
The inconsequence argument is most likely to be invoked by those who endorse the
consequentialist idea that acts are to be morally assessed principally by reference to
the quality of the outcomes that they contribute to or cause. As Shelly Kagan notes,
‘the fundamental consequentialist idea’ involves ‘looking to see what difference a given
act makes’.10 When an act appears to make no difference – because the outcome with
which it is associated would have occurred regardless of whether or not the act was
performed – consequentialists struggle to condemn the act in question.
The inconsequence argument is less likely to resonate with those whose conception
of morality is deontological in character. While some deontologists can and often do
regard the quality of outcomes as relevant to their moral assessments, they also believe
that acting to produce the best outcomes can sometimes be morally wrongful. For
example, while two innocent people being killed is worse than one innocent person
being killed, many deontologists believe that it is morally wrong to kill one innocent
person in order to prevent two innocent people being killed. If it can be wrong to act
so as to produce an outcome that is better than that which would otherwise obtain,
then it can also be wrong to act so as to produce an outcome that is merely no differ-
ent to that which would otherwise obtain.
Nevertheless, deontologists do sometimes defend actions by appealing to their
inconsequential character. Consider Bernard Williams’s famous case of a traveller,
Jim, who stumbles onto the scene of an imminent massacre. In Williams’s case, a sol-
dier is about to murder twenty villagers, but he tells Jim that he will spare nineteen of
his intended victims if Jim kills one of them.11 Many deontologists believe that Jim is
permitted to kill one villager. Moreover, this conviction is not grounded exclusively in
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the fact that, by killing one, Jim will save many others. Had the soldier offered to spare
his intended victims if Jim agreed to kill someone in a neighbouring village, whom the
soldier had no intention of killing himself, many deontologists would deny that Jim
may accept the soldier’s offer. This implies that it is permissible for Jim to kill the one
only because his doing so appears inconsequential: the one will die regardless of what
Jim does.12
Nevertheless, it might be said that arming outlaw states has less in common with
Williams’s original case and more in common with a variation suggested by Victor
Tadros. In Tadros’s case, the soldier intends to kill only one villager. If Jim kills the
villager instead, the soldier will reward Jim with some jellybeans that would otherwise
be wasted. Tadros suggests that, in this case, ‘it is surely wrong for Jim to kill’, despite
the fact that the villager will be no worse off than if Jim had declined the soldier’s
offer.13 Perhaps Britain selling weapons to Hong Kong is like Jim killing the villager
for some jellybeans, and therefore it is surely wrong.
However, there is an obvious, and deontologically salient, difference between what
we know about Jim’s actions and what we know about those of many arms exporters.
We know that if Jim kills the villager, he will intend to cause harm. He will use the vil-
lager as a means to obtain the jelly beans. By contrast, for all that we know, many
arms exporters merely foresee that the arms they sell may be used to inflict harms
upon the innocent. If the weapons in question are not used in this way but are instead
used to advance legitimate security interests, it is natural to assume that the exporters’
plan will not be in any way frustrated. This is because, in many cases, it is natural to
assume that the exporters’ plan is merely to enhance their wealth, and this plan is real-
ized once the weapons are sold. The plan’s success is not dependent upon the weap-
ons being used for any particular purpose. To make this point even clearer, suppose
the weapons are destroyed by a rebel attack almost as soon as they are delivered.
Again, the exporters’ plan will not be in any way undermined.
This observation is not intended to demonstrate that deontologists should endorse
the inconsequence argument. Here is a brief sketch of a plausible deontological reply
to that argument. Proponents of the inconsequence argument treat the disadvantage of
others as an opportunity for personal or communal gain. This is disrespectful. The
disadvantaged individuals in question are the victims of outlaw states, and their disad-
vantage consists both in their vulnerability to those states and in the fact that – in the
cases to which the inconsequence argument is supposed to apply – there are actors
willing to supply their abusers with weapons.
Treating others’ disadvantage as an opportunity for gain is not the same as treating
the mitigation of others’ disadvantage as an opportunity for gain. The mitigation of
others’ disadvantage is treated as an opportunity for gain in a wide variety of seemingly
innocuous practices. For example, a funeral director treats someone’s death as a
source of gain. But the gain is achieved by attempting to ameliorate the suffering that
the death engenders, to wit, by providing friends and relatives with a vehicle through
which to honour, mourn, and bid farewell to the deceased.
By contrast, what the inconsequence argument seeks to vindicate is sheer exploita-
tion. The gains reaped derive not from the mitigation of disadvantage, but from its
facilitation.
While I think this deontological objection has potential, I shall not pursue it here.
Instead, I shall set it aside and develop an alternative reply to the inconsequence
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argument. While this alternative reply grows in the same soil as certain deontological
considerations – considerations relating to the harms that can be expressed through
certain kinds of action – I will endeavour to show that it can be embraced by conse-
quentialists. As indicated above, I believe that this alternative strategy is valuable
because it shows that the inconsequence argument can be met on its own terms.
Before I proceed, I should note one feature of my approach. Although the primary
aim of the inconsequence argument is to show that particular arms sales create no
bads that would not otherwise exist, I will assume, while evaluating this argument, that
the sales to which it is applied create no goods that would not otherwise exist. An
implication of this assumption is that if, contrary to what the inconsequence argument
suggests, a particular sale does create bads that would not otherwise exist, the sale
would be impugned on consequentialist grounds, for the sale creates no goods that
could outweigh those bads. I make this assumption for three reasons. First, in certain
parts of the article, the assumption is necessary to make exposition less unwieldy than
it would otherwise be. Second, it enables us to focus our attention on the argument
under scrutiny and to avoid being distracted by extraneous considerations. Third, it
reflects the manner in which the inconsequence argument is most likely to be used in
practice. When politicians can point to potential goods associated with making an
arms sale that would otherwise be made by others, and not just to the absence of bads,
it is these goods that they are most likely to emphasize. In such cases, the inconse-
quence argument is less likely to be invoked.
Before I turn to pursue my primary aim, we should pause to get clearer about the
nature of the argument we are assessing. More specifically, we should distinguish
between two distinct forms that the inconsequence argument can assume and briefly
note several problems that each form might encounter.
2. Retrospective and Prospective
The inconsequence argument can be invoked retrospectively or prospectively. An arms
seller who invokes the argument retrospectively says ‘the sale did not make a difference,
and was therefore permissible’. An arms seller who invokes the argument prospectively
says ‘the sale will not (or likely will not) make a difference, and is therefore permissi-
ble’. To be clear, whether an application of the inconsequence argument is retrospec-
tive or prospective is not determined by the time at which it is made. Philip
Hammond was defending the sale of tear gas to Hong Kong after the sale had been
made, but this does not mean that his defence was necessarily retrospective in charac-
ter. Hammond might have been claiming, after the fact, that prior to the sale being
made, the relevant officials reasonably believed the sale would not make a difference
and was permissible for that reason. This claim would be an example of a prospective
application of the inconsequence argument, despite being advanced after the sale was
made.
Let us consider each version of the argument is greater detail, beginning with the
retrospective version. A potential problem with this version of the argument is that it
is insensitive to what is indicated by available evidence prior to a sale being made and
to how exporters interact with that evidence. Consider the following case.
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Evidence
Prior to a sale being made, the available evidence, which is seen by the seller, strongly
suggests that the sale will make a relevant difference. This is because the evidence sug-
gests that the weapons to be sold are not being offered (in the same quantities or at
the same price) by other suppliers. However, after the sale is made, it transpires that
the weapons sold were offered (in the same quantities or at the same price) by other
suppliers and that the sale therefore did not make a difference.
The upshot of the retrospective version of the inconsequence argument is that the sale
in Evidence was permissible. In one sense, this conclusion is plausible. It is plausible to
conclude that the sale in Evidence was permissible relative to the facts.14 As a matter of
fact, the sale did not make a difference. If we accept that a usually impermissible act
can be permissible when inconsequential, it is plausible to conclude that the sale in
Evidence was permissible in a fact-relative sense.
However, there is another sense in which the verdict reached by the retrospective
version of the inconsequence argument is mistaken. While it is plausible to conclude
that the sale in Evidence was permissible in a fact-relative sense, we should conclude
that the sale was impermissible relative to the evidence. If the available evidence sug-
gested that the sale would make a difference, and if we accept that the sale would have
been impermissible in the fact-relative sense if it had made a difference, then there
were weighty moral reasons for the exporter in Evidence not to make the sale. A poten-
tial problem with the retrospective version of the inconsequence argument is that it
overlooks these reasons. Given the gravity of the decision to transfer arms to an outlaw
state – given, that is, the severity of the adverse effects that such a transfer could have
on the basic interests of innocent people – it is morally important that exporters be
guided by the available evidence.
A related potential problem with the retrospective version of the inconsequence
argument can be brought into focus by considering the following case.
Ignorance
An arms sale to an outlaw state does not make a difference. Prior to the sale being
made, the available evidence suggested that the sale would not make a difference. The
official responsible for authorizing the sale did not consult the evidence.
The sale made in Ignorance is permissible in both a fact-relative and evidence-relative
sense. But there is nevertheless a sense in which the official appears to act wrongly.
Two considerations account for this. First, the proposition, supported in this case by
the evidence, that an arms sale to an outlaw state will not make a difference to the
outlaw state’s subjects is counterintuitive. Weapons are what we might call other-affect-
ing products. Unlike pizza or a novel – which are self-affecting products purchased pri-
marily for the effects that they induce in the consumer – weapons are designed to
enable the user to affect others. To be sure, the user seeks to affect others as a means
of altering her own situation – as a means to greater power or security, say – but she
seeks to affect others nonetheless. We would not usually expect a consumer to pur-
chase weapons if she did not anticipate being able to use those weapons to affect the
lives of second parties (to injure, to kill, to intimidate, and so forth). Moreover, we
would not usually expect a consumer to buy weapons from a particular supplier unless
that supplier has some virtue – he supplies weapons of a higher quality or at a lower
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price, for example – that distinguishes him from other vendors. For this reason, prior
to consulting the particulars of a specific case, one should be guided by the presump-
tion that providing weapons to an outlaw state will make a difference.
Second, the particular difference that one should presume will be made concerns
the basic interests of innocent people. Weapons are used not merely to affect second
parties, but to severely compromise their physical wellbeing. Moreover, outlaw states,
by definition, often act in ways that are antagonistic to the basic interests of the inno-
cent. For this reason, prior to consulting the particulars of a specific case, one should
be guided by the presumption that providing weapons to an outlaw state will affect the
lives of others in a seriously adverse fashion. The official in Ignorance appears to act
wrongly because she fails to be guided by these two presumptions.
I have described the issues raised in the preceding paragraphs as ‘potential’ prob-
lems with the inconsequence argument. I have described the issues in this way
because, as I have said, my ultimate aim in this article is to respond to the inconse-
quence argument in a manner congenial to consequentialists, and there are differences
between consequentialists that have implications for how these issues should be
appraised.
At least some of the relevant differences can be captured by the distinction between
subjective and objective consequentialism.15 Objective consequentialism evaluates acts in
relation to the outcomes that they produce. Right acts are those that produce out-
comes that are at least no worse than the alternatives. By contrast, subjective conse-
quentialism evaluates acts in relation to the decision-making procedure via which they
were selected. Right acts are those that the actor selects using a decision-making pro-
cedure that is consequentialist in character.
Subjective consequentialists can condemn the arms sales in both Evidence and Igno-
rance. This is because, in both cases, the sellers disregard evidence that a consequen-
tialist decision-making procedure would take into account. By contrast, objective
consequentialists might not condemn these sales. This is because the outcomes pro-
duced by the sales are not relevantly different to the outcomes that would have materi-
alised had the sales not gone ahead.
The retrospective version of the inconsequence argument faces the potential prob-
lems that I have identified because it is concerned exclusively with actual outcomes
and is therefore inevitably insensitive to questions about what evidence is available ex
ante. By contrast, the prospective version of the inconsequence argument is concerned
with expected outcomes and can therefore take such questions seriously. The prospec-
tive version of the inconsequence argument says that an arms sale is permissible if the
seller has reasonably inferred from the available evidence that the sale is unlikely to
make a difference.
The prospective version of the inconsequence argument could potentially issue
judgements that conflict with objective consequentialism – e.g. it could approve a
transfer that, contrary to reasonable expectations, ends up making a difference – but
because it takes seriously the kinds of considerations that would be taken into account
by a consequentialist decision-making procedure, it might appeal to subjective conse-
quentialists.
However, the prospective version of the inconsequence argument has shortcomings
that are relevant for a subjective consequentialist evaluation. These shortcomings are
epistemic in nature. It will often be very difficult to establish that an arms transfer to
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an outlaw state will not make a difference, and this fact limits the argument’s applica-
bility. In order to establish that transfers to a particular state will not make a relevant
difference, it is not sufficient to point out that there are other suppliers willing to sell
to that state. A variety of further questions have to be considered. How much of which
products is the recipient requesting, and when? How much of which products are
being offered by other suppliers, and when? Are other suppliers capable of satisfying
demand at a given time? Are other suppliers likely to refuse or revoke export licences
for any requested products? At what price are other suppliers offering their products?
Specifically, are other suppliers offering goods at a higher or lower price?
Suppose that Britain and the United States both offer weapons to Bahrain, but that
Britain offers weapons more cheaply. A consequence of Britain selling the weapons is
that the Bahraini government can free up resources in its budget, which it will either
use to acquire more weapons or devote to alternative projects. In the case of outlaw
states that are willing to expend some resources meeting the needs of (some subset of)
their citizens, there is one (defeasible) reason to support cheaper arms sales that free
up resources in their budgets. In other cases, freeing up resources in an outlaw state’s
budget might be a consideration that tells against cheaper arms sales. Which kind of
case one is dealing with is a further question that an exporter must be able to answer.
It is also important to note that arms transfers are not always authorized on a one-
by-one basis. In many cases, governments authorize an indefinite number of sales over
an extended period. For example, the British government sometimes issues what are
called ‘Open Individual Export Licences’ (OIELs). These impose no limits on the
quantity of what is sold, and no record of value is maintained. (The 2015 license
authorizing sales to Hong Kong that I mentioned in the introduction was of this kind.)
If an exporting government does not even know how much of which weapons it has
allowed to be transferred, it cannot plausibly claim to know that the transfer is unlikely
to make a difference.
These limitations of the prospective version of the inconsequence argument are all
of a practical kind, and the concerns relating to OIELs could be addressed with rela-
tive ease. For, governments could simply refuse to issue such licences for the sale of
weapons to outlaw states. This might compromise efficiency, but that would be a good
thing. This is a situation where throwing a wrench or two into the gears of market effi-
ciency is to be actively encouraged.
Let us assume that, in at least some instances, arms sellers can reasonably infer
from the available evidence that an arms transfer will not increase the harms that an
outlaw state is capable of inflicting (relative to a scenario in which that transfer is not
made). Let us also assume that, in at least some subset of these instances, an arms
transfer will not increase the harms that an outlaw state is capable of inflicting. In these
cases, are there reasons that consequentialists can appeal to in order to condemn the
sales in question? In order to answer this question (which I will answer affirmatively),
we must first distinguish between two types of transfer.
3. Conditional and Unconditional
Notice that there are two distinct acts that a proponent of the inconsequence argu-
ment could be trying to defend: the unconditional sale of weapons and the conditional
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sale of weapons, the relevant condition being that the sale is not expected to make a
difference. What I shall call a ‘conditional exporter’ sells weapons to outlaw states only
if the sales are not expected to make a difference. An ‘unconditional exporter’, by con-
trast, sells weapons regardless of whether the sales are expected to make a difference.
Conditional and unconditional exporters are distinguished by the nature of their
intentions. As Thomas Scanlon notes, in order to establish what an agent intended, it
is necessary to consider ‘which of the various features of what she realized she was
doing were features she took to count in favor of acting in this way’.16 A conditional
exporter takes the fact that a proposed sale is not expected to make a difference as
counting in favour of going ahead with that sale (and takes the fact that a proposed
sale is expected to make a difference as counting against going ahead with the sale).
By contrast, an unconditional exporter does not attribute to these facts any normative
significance.
It is sometimes maintained that the intention with which an agent acts can affect the
permissibility of her action. If intentions are relevant to permissibility in this way, we
could appeal to this fact in order to criticize the actions of unconditional exporters.
We could argue that, since an unconditional exporter sells weapons regardless of
whether the sales are expected to make a difference, his action is impugned by his
intentions. The sale is morally wrong regardless of whether or not it is expected to
make a difference.
However, my aim here is to develop a reply to the inconsequence argument that is
congenial to a wide range of consequentialists, and while the mental states of agents
are sometimes subjected to evaluation from a consequentialist perspective17, conse-
quentialism is not commonly associated with the belief that an act’s permissibility can
be affected by the intention with which it is performed. Moreover, I wish to demon-
strate that consequentialists have resources with which to condemn the acts not only
of unconditional exporters, but also of conditional exporters, who intend to sell weap-
ons to outlaw states only when the sale is not expected to make a difference. I will
argue that consequentialists can criticize conditional and unconditional sales alike by
appealing to the normative significance of perceived intentions (or of what I will call
the object-centred meaning of an act), and of the effect that perceived intentions can
have on those by whom they are perceived.
As a first step in this argument, we can note that intentions have sometimes been
regarded as relevant to permissibility (by deontologists) in virtue of their ability to
affect the meaning of one’s action. To illustrate this point, Scanlon notes that missing
a friend’s wedding because one has to undergo surgery means something significantly
different to missing a friend’s wedding in order to attend an event at which a well-
known celebrity is making an appearance.18 Missing your friend’s wedding for the lat-
ter reason reveals something significant about how you conceive of your relationship;
it expresses the judgement that you attribute relatively little value to the relationship.
Scanlon goes on to argue that meanings attributable to an agent’s intentions can
sometimes render an act impermissible. For instance, the wrong of discrimination can
sometimes be explained, at least in part, by appealing to the fact that discriminatory
acts ‘involve a kind of insult’.19 Such acts are wrong, in part, ‘because of their mean-
ing – the judgement of inferiority that they express and thereby help to maintain’.20
Now, for present purposes, it is important to distinguish between what we might call
the subject-centred meaning of an act and the object-centred meaning of an act. An act’s
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subject-centred meaning is determined by the intentions of the person who performs it
(the subject). By contrast, an act’s object-centred meaning is determined by how the
subject’s intentions are perceived by the person acted upon (the object). The subject-
centred and object-centred meanings of some acts coincide. Think of a white-hooded
figure holding aloft a burning cross in the American South. But some acts have sub-
ject-centred and object-centred meanings that diverge (at least in certain contexts). To
illustrate, consider the following two cases.
Funeral
Brenda is supposed to attend the funeral of her stepmother, but doing so will mean
missing a football game that is being broadcast at the same time. In order to get out
of attending the funeral, Brenda claims to have been stricken with terrible food poi-
soning. Brenda is a very good liar, and the family buys her excuse.
Party
Carol is friendly with two colleagues, Dana and Ed, whom she originally met at her
church. Dana and Ed have been suspended from work for making homophobic com-
ments to their new coworker, Fay. Fay’s birthday is approaching, and Carol receives
an invitation to her party. Carol would like to attend, but she will be away on holiday.
Carol declines the invitation, and Fay takes this as a homophobic snub.
In each of these cases, the subject-centred and object-centred meanings of an act
diverge. They are able to diverge because the subject’s intentions are opaque and can
be interpreted in multiple ways.
We are now in a position to identify two distinct ways in which an act can be objec-
tionable in virtue of its meaning. (When I describe an act as ‘objectionable’, I mean
that the act has some feature that gives us a reason to think that we ought, morally, to
refrain from performing the act, but that the act might be permissible all things con-
sidered.) First, an act can be objectionable in virtue of its subject-centred meaning.
The objectionable character of the relevant acts can be explicated in terms familiar
from deontological ethics. We can say that an act is objectionable in virtue of its sub-
ject-centred meaning when the subject’s intentions are inadequately responsive to the
interests or moral status of the object. Second, an act can be objectionable in virtue of
its object-centred meaning. An act is objectionable in virtue of its object-centred
meaning when the subject’s intentions are reasonably perceived to be inadequately
responsive to the interests or status of the object, and regardless of whether or not they
actually are inadequately responsive. I will suggest that this second form of objection-
ableness can be recognized by consequentialists.
Brenda’s act in Funeral can be regarded as objectionable in virtue of its subject-cen-
tred meaning, whereas Carol’s act in Party is potentially objectionable in virtue of its
object-centred meaning. Given Carol’s close association with Dana and Ed, and given
their shared religious association (which could perhaps credibly be identified as the
source of their homophobic attitudes), it might be reasonable to interpret Carol’s
declination of Fay’s invitation as a homophobic snub. Moreover, since a homophobic
snub is an especially pernicious form of insult, an act that can reasonably be inter-
preted as a homophobic snub can also reasonably be interpreted as inadequately
responsive to the interests and status of its object.
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It is important to note, however, that an act that is potentially objectionable in virtue
of its object-centred meaning can be vindicated by remedial action undertaken by the
subject. The subject can alter a primary act’s object-centred meaning by executing sub-
sidiary acts that influence the object’s interpretation of the primary act. Through these
subsidiary acts, the subject can communicate to the object that she does not in fact
endorse the attitudes that, when taken in isolation, the primary act appeared to
express. For example, Carol could apologize for not attending Fay’s party, explain her
reasons for not attending, and suggest to Fay that the pair meet up to socialize on
some other occasion.
Let me elaborate on the nature of acts that are objectionable in virtue of their
object-centred meaning. These acts are capable of inflicting what – to coin a term of
art – we might call expressed harms. In one sense, an expressed harm is similar to an ex-
pressive harm, a concept familiar from the legal-theoretic literature. These two kinds of
harm are similar inasmuch as they are each produced by the expression of certain
ideas or attitudes.21 But there are also important respects in which the two kinds of
harm differ. To begin with, an expressed harm is a function of the attitudes that are
attributed to certain agents, by the victim, in light of the agents’ actions. The agents in
question do not actually have to have the attitudes that are attributed to them. By con-
trast, in order for an expressive harm to occur, the agents in question do actually have
to possess the relevant attitudes. As Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes explain,
the notion of expression that they have in mind when explicating expressive harms
refers to ways in which people ‘express their cognitive states’.22 To borrow a distinc-
tion presented by Simon Blackburn, we can say that the idea of an expressed harm
rests on an intensional account of expression – whereby ‘a person can express a belief
or attitude that she does not hold’ – whereas the idea of an expressive harm rests on a
revelational account of expression – ‘whereby an action reveals something further true
of the agent’.23
There are two further potential differences between expressed and expressive harms.
I conceive of expressed harms as lacking two features that expressive harms are some-
times thought to possess. According to one account, an expressive harm can occur (1)
without the relevant ideas or attitudes being successfully communicated to the victim,
and (2) if the relevant ideas and attitudes are successfully communicated, without the
victim experiencing any kind of distress engendered by their communication.24 In
other words, an expressive harm is constituted by the activity of the agent who creates
it. It inheres in the transmission of certain ideas or attitudes, not in their receipt, and
not in any kind of reaction accompanying their receipt. As Blackburn observes, these
features render expressive harms a ‘fundamentally nonconsequentialist’ idea.25
Expressed harms lack these features. They cannot be inflicted without being experi-
enced by a victim. On the contrary, they are constituted, at least in part, by their vic-
tim’s experience. This feature of expressed harms is significant, because it removes
one reason for consequentialists not to recognize expressed harms as normatively
important. What positive reasons do consequentialists have to recognize expressed
harms as normatively important? The general answer to this question is that conse-
quentialists care about the quality of outcomes, the quality of outcomes is often
regarded as a function of the welfare enjoyed by individuals, and expressed harms are
welfare reducing. Expressed harms reduce welfare by insulting their victims, but, as
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we shall see, the nature of these insults must be conceptualized differently by different
forms of consequentialism.
If expressed harms can be recognized by consequentialists, they can help us to reply to
the inconsequence argument on its own terms. More specifically, they can help us to
demonstrate how arming outlaw states does make an adverse difference to the lives of
those states’ victims, even when weapons would inevitably have been supplied by some-
one. It is to the task of formulating this reply that we should now turn our attention.
4. Replying to the Inconsequence Argument
An unconditional transfer of weapons to an outlaw state can be regarded as straight-
forwardly objectionable in virtue of its subject-centred meaning. An unconditional
exporter intends to sell regardless of whether the sale is likely to make a seriously
adverse material difference to the lives of innocent people. In other words, the fact
that a particular sale is not likely to make a seriously adverse difference to the lives of
innocent people is not something that the exporter regards as counting in favour of
that sale. To be sure, he does not intend to make an adverse difference, nor does he
intend to avoid making an adverse difference. As I said, he intends to sell regardless of
whether the sale is expected to make a difference. Such an intention is plainly inade-
quately responsive to the interests and status of the innocent people in question. By
contrast, a conditional transfer of weapons to an outlaw state is not straightforwardly
objectionable in virtue of its subject-centred meaning. A conditional exporter intends
to sell only if the sale is expected to be inconsequential. Such an intention is not
plainly inadequately responsive to anyone’s interests or status.
While an unconditional transfer can be regarded as objectionable in virtue of its
subject-centred meaning, it is not obviously objectionable in virtue of its object-cen-
tred meaning. This is because the intentions of an unconditional exporter are likely to
be opaque. The relevant objects may therefore misinterpret the exporter’s intentions
and believe that the exports are in fact conditional. Similarly, while a conditional
transfer need not be regarded as objectionable in virtue of its subject-centred meaning,
it might be regarded as objectionable in virtue of its object-centred meaning. Again,
this is because the intentions of the exporter are likely to be opaque. The relevant
objects may believe that the exports are in fact unconditional and therefore suffer
expressed harm engendered by communication of the intentions that unconditional
transfers embody.
In precisely what way can an arms sale be regarded as objectionable, by consequen-
tialists, in virtue of its object-centred meaning? In light of the discussion in the previ-
ous section, we can say that these sales have the capacity to inflict expressed harms.
But how, exactly, should the insults that are constitutive of these harms be conceived
by consequentialists? To be more precise, how (and in what way) can an arms sale
that is perceived to be unconditional be regarded as insulting by a consequentialist?
The answer to this question will vary depending on the type of consequentialism
that one endorses. Let us begin with subjective consequentialism. For subjective con-
sequentialists, right acts are those selected by a consequentialist decision-making pro-
cedure. One acts rightly by consciously aiming to produce outcomes that are at least
no worse than the available alternatives. From the perspective of subjective
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied
Philosophy
12 James Christensen
consequentialism, a perceived unconditional exporter is perceived as failing to deliber-
ate in a consequentialist manner. This is because an unconditional exporter sells
weapons regardless of whether, by doing so, he will produce outcomes that are worse
than the available alternatives. These are outcomes in which some people’s interests
are undermined, and in which the undermining of their interests cannot be justified
on consequentialist grounds. From a subjective consequentialist perspective, victims of
outlaw states can feel insulted by perceived unconditional exports because the seller
who initiates these exports appears to have attributed to their interests less weight than
consequentialist deliberation requires.
Now let us consider objective consequentialism. According to objective consequential-
ism, the right acts are those that actually produce outcomes that are at least no worse
than the available alternatives. On this view, one does not have to deliberate in any par-
ticular way in order to act rightly. Suppose that, when deciding how to choose between
two actions, one of which will produce a bad outcome (in which some people’s welfare is
undermined), and one which will produce a good outcome (in which some people’s wel-
fare is improved), I choose how to act by flipping a coin. Suppose that, by chance, the
act selected by this decision-making procedure, and the act that I therefore perform, is
the one that produces a good outcome. According to the objective consequentialist, I act
rightly by performing this act. However, while the objective consequentialist is disbarred
from saying I have acted wrongly, she can nevertheless say that my behaviour exhibits a
bad attitude. I have risked performing an act that would be wrong by objective conse-
quentialist standards and which would undermine the welfare of certain individuals with-
out a moral justification. Those whose welfare might have been undermined can be
insulted by the attitude that my behaviour exhibits.
Perceived unconditional exporters act in a manner that is morally comparable to my
coin-flipping behaviour and thereby exhibit an attitude that objective consequentialists
can regard as bad. These exporters demonstrate an apparent willingness to act in a
manner that would be wrong by objective consequentialist standards and which would
undermine the welfare of certain individuals without a moral justification. Those
whose welfare might have been undermined can be insulted by the attitude that this
behaviour exhibits. The message conveyed to them is that the exporter in question
attributes insignificant weight to their interests.
For now, it is sufficient to observe that arms sales to outlaw states could inflict
expressed harms (i.e., if their objects perceive the sales to be unconditional). I will
return to the question of whether these sales are likely to inflict expressed harms
(whether their objects are likely to perceive the sales as unconditional) presently.
The observation that arms transfers could inflict expressed harms in addition to any
material harms that they engender does not immediately pose a challenge to the incon-
sequence argument. As it is typically conceived by its proponents, the inconsequence
argument refers exclusively to the material harms that sales enable outlaw states to
inflict on their victims. But the argument could easily be reframed to be more accom-
modating. A suitably reframed version of the argument would claim that when any
harms associated with a particular sale – material or expressed – will inevitably be
inflicted by some agent, the harms in question can be inflicted permissibly.
However, once it is conceded that arms transfers can cause expressed harms, the
inconsequence argument begins to lose purchase. This is because the concession
prompts the realization that relevant expressed harms can be inflicted not only by
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sales, but also by offers, and by other related acts such as invitations to arms fairs. To
illustrate: every two years, London hosts the Defence and Security Equipment Interna-
tional event (DSEI), to which the British government invites representatives from a
variety of outlaw states. Past invitees have included representatives from Bahrain,
Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia,26 each of which is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom
House and as an ‘authoritarian regime’ in the Democracy Index. While an invitation
to this event is not a guarantee that the government will approve any particular arms
sale to these states, it does send an especially perspicuous message that Britain is open
for business. To the victims of these outlaw states, this message is likely to be expres-
sively harmful. The invitations can reasonably be interpreted as suggesting that the
interests of those routinely brutalized by these regimes are given inadequate weight in
the practical deliberations of the British government.
Now, the crucial point is that, unlike sales, offers (and other related acts) from one
state do not substitute for offers from another. Arms sales, and the material harms
with which they are associated, are such that if they are enacted by one state, they will
not be enacted by another state. But offers, and the expressed harms with which they
are associated, are a different matter. Offers from multiple states can be, and are,
made simultaneously. Moreover, they are made alongside any sales. If these offers
inflict expressed harms, as seems likely, these harms are additive rather than substitu-
tive. To these harms, the inconsequence argument has no application.
Earlier, I noted but did not explore the possibility that, given the opacity of expor-
ters’ intentions, an unconditional sale that is objectionable in virtue of its subject-cen-
tred meaning might be unobjectionable in virtue of its object-centred meaning, and
that, conversely, a conditional sale that is unobjectionable in virtue of its subject-cen-
tred meaning might be objectionable in virtue of its object-centred meaning. In short,
the issue is that the members of a receiving state might misinterpret a sending state’s
intentions.
It seems likely that conditional sales are more liable to misinterpretation than
unconditional sales. That is, it seems more likely that conditional sales will be seen as
unconditional than it does that unconditional sales will be seen as conditional. When
an exporter provides or offers weapons to an outlaw state, it is providing the tools with
which that state’s victims can expect to be abused. This is an immensely antagonistic
gesture. These victims will often have no reason to give the exporter the benefit of the
doubt, no reason to believe that the exporter made the sale only because it believed
that doing so would be inconsequential. In other words, victims often have no reason
to believe that the exporter regards itself as in any relevant way constrained by their
interests. To use a phrase familiar in the literature on expressive harms, appearances
matter, and, in the kinds of cases with which we are concerned, appearances are
hardly flattering. An outlaw state’s victims are most likely to regard an arms exporter
as guilty until proven otherwise.
Could it be reasonably established that a conditional exporter really is what it claims
to be? Might such an exporter engage in subsidiary acts that vindicate the primary act
of exporting? Simply claiming to be a conditional exporter is clearly not enough.
Might one prove one’s credentials by pointing to other cases in which export licences
to outlaw states have been refused or revoked when it appeared that a sale would make
a difference? The problem here is that such decisions could have been motivated by
one of several different reasons. They could have been motivated by concern for the
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outlaw state’s victims, but they could also have been motivated by self-interested con-
siderations. Perhaps a particular licence was refused because there was a risk that the
sale in question would compromise national security or alienate an ally. Perhaps the
officials in question were motivated by a concern for their own reputation as perceived
by the electorate. Or perhaps the officials who dealt with certain sales in the past really
were motivated by other-regarding concerns, but it cannot be inferred from this that
the officials dealing with sales in the present are similarly motivated.
It might be said that expressed harms associated with sales and offers to outlaw
states could be nullified not by ceasing trade, but by ensuring that sales and offers are
made with an adequate degree of discretion. Expressed harms occur because those
affected are aware of sales and offers being made. But if sales and offers were executed
covertly, there would be no expressions by which one could be harmed. In other
words, the suggestion is that a problem which, in some cases, is partly attributable to
opaque intentions could be ameliorated by introducing still greater opacity. Accepting
this would be a highly counterintuitive conclusion. Most activists believe that the arms
trade is marked by a dearth of transparency, not a surfeit.
I think that the appropriate response to this argument is that, as anti-arms-trade
campaigners have established, we have weighty independent reasons to call for greater
transparency in the arms trade. Transparency is needed to root out corruption, to
ensure that existing rules are followed, and to limit the extent of transfers that are
likely to cause material harm. Since transparency is crucial for these reasons, the
expressed harms that transparency makes possible must be addressed by other means.
I have not shown that it is impossible for a genuinely conditional exporter (if any
actually exist) to ensure that its intentions are accurately perceived. I have suggested
that doing so will be very difficult, but there are some subsidiary acts that one could
imagine succeeding. One possibility is that an exporter could share its profits with the
victims of the outlaw state that it arms. Suppose that, after selling tear gas to the Hong
Kong police, Britain had donated a sizeable share of the proceeds to Hong Kong’s
prodemocracy movement. If Britain had done this, the arms sales would have consti-
tuted a redistribution of resources from Hong Kong’s increasingly repressive govern-
ment to its increasingly embattled democratic adversaries. And Britain would have
engineered that redistribution. It is possible that such an act might prevent any
expressed harm from occurring. Whether it is the kind of act that Britain, or any other
professedly liberal-democratic state, would ever actually go through with is, of course,
another question.
5. Conclusion
Politicians often defend arms sales to outlaw states by claiming that the sales in ques-
tion make no morally relevant difference to the lives of the recipients’ victims. Accord-
ing to this defence, which I have called the inconsequence argument, a government
will often make no morally relevant difference by selling arms to an outlaw state
because, if the government in question had not sold the weapons, weapons would have
been sold by some other government. This argument appeals to the consequentialist
idea that acts are to be assessed principally in relation to the outcomes that they pro-
duce. Right actions produce outcomes that are at least no worse than the alternatives.
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Because a government that sells weapons to an outlaw state allegedly produces out-
comes no worse than those that would have materialized had it not sold the weapons,
selling the weapons is claimed to be permissible.
It is now clear that the inconsequence argument trades on an important but implicit
assumption, namely, that the only harms to which arms sales to outlaw states can con-
tribute are the harms that the recipient outlaw state will itself use the weapons to
inflict. This assumption is important for the inconsequence argument because, in cases
where there are multiple potential suppliers, these contributions to harm are substitu-
tive: they substitute for contributions that would otherwise have been made by a differ-
ent supplier.
We have seen that this crucial assumption is false. Arms trading harms its victims
not only by enabling the harms inflicted by recipients but also by expressing the often-
malign attitudes of sellers. In this way, arms sales can be insulting. They can reveal
the disrespectfully small degree of significance ascribed by sellers to the interests of
their victims. Importantly, this disrespect is expressed not only by sales, but by offers,
and offers are additive rather than substitutive in character. They can be, and often
are, made by multiple sellers simultaneously. Each offer constitutes an additional
insult.
The insulting character of arms sales is most easily recognized in the case of explic-
itly unconditional exports, that is, in cases where the seller clearly intends to sell
regardless of whether doing so will make an adverse difference to the lives of the recip-
ient state’s victims. In the case of explicitly conditional exports, where the seller clearly
intends to sell only if sales will not make an adverse difference, the insulting character
of arms sales may be less apparent. But intentions are often opaque. We have to con-
sider the object-centred meaning of sales, in addition to their subject-centred meaning.
In other words, we have to pay attention to how sales may be perceived. Since condi-
tional sales (if any are actually ever made) will often be mistaken for unconditional
sales, the former will often be just as insulting – just as expressively harmful – as the
latter.
The expressed harms inflicted by arms sales to outlaw states must be taken seriously
by consequentialists. These harms are bads that must be accounted for in the conse-
quentialist calculus. To be sure, the fact that an arms sale inflicts an expressed harm is
not in itself a decisive consideration against the sale. An overall consequentialist
assessment must weigh the harms that arms sales produce against any goods that they
might create. Still, the fact that arms sales to outlaw states inflict expressed harms is
important. It demonstrates that arms sales to outlaw states can produce harms that
would not otherwise have existed even in cases where there are multiple potential sup-
pliers. When politicians invoke the inconsequence argument, they seek to make us lose
sight of this fact. We must not.
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